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## **THE KOSOVO CONFLICT AND MACEDONIA**

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### 1. The position of the Albanian minority in Kosovo

SFR Yugoslavia (former Yugoslavia, existing till 1991) was a complex multinational state, inhabited by Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Muslims, and by a large number of national minorities<sup>1)</sup> and ethnic groups, the most numerous of which were Albanians and Hungarians. The number and the percentage of Albanians in SFR Yugoslavia (as well as Muslims) increased continuously: from 927,000 (5%) in 1961 to 1,727,000 (7.7%) in 1981 and to 2,188,000 (9.3%) in 1991<sup>2)</sup>. Such a tendency in the long term led to a change in the balance between the nations, i.e. nationalities, and to subsequent problems in their mutual relations.

The creation of the two autonomous provinces within the framework of the Republic of Serbia: Kosovo and Vojvodina, was characteristic from the aspect of national minorities. In Kosovo, the majority of the population were Albanians and their numbers increased (in 1961 - 67%, and in 1991 - 90% of the population of the province), whereas the number of Serbs decreased (from 23.5% in 1961, to 10% in 1991).

The position of the Albanians in Kosovo<sup>3)</sup> began to improve significantly especially since the end of the 60s. After the protests of the Albanian population in 1968, the autonomy of the province and economic assistance to Kosovo increased significantly. The exchange in the fields of culture and education with Albania was allowed. The media in the Albanian language were undergoing significant expansion.

With the 1974 Constitution, even though Kosovo (and Vojvodina) officially remained a part of Serbian territory, they also became direct participants in the Federation, and participated with their representatives in the Council of Republics and Provinces of the Federal Assembly (Article 292, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution), in the Presidency, as a collective chief of state (Article 321)<sup>4)</sup>, and in the Constitutional Court. The Constitution guaranteed the Albanians freedom of thought, speech, assembly, association, as well as schools, university, media in their mother tongue, freedom of movement in the country and abroad. Education in the languages of the minorities was guaranteed in the elementary and high schools and was financed by the state. There was a separate university in Albanian in Prishtina, where a large majority of the students were of the Albanian nationality. Majority of the members of the Kosovo Academy of sciences and arts were of the Albanian nationality. In the capital of Kosovo, Prishtina, many social institutions functioned, from a TV studio to the daily newspaper in the Albanian language "Rilindja", and a large library of Albanian literature. Members of the Albanian minority were in a majority among the members of the police force in Kosovo and they had equal representation in the political forums and parliaments (from municipal to federal level). In the 80s, Sinan Hasani, an Albanian from Kosovo, in accordance with the Constitution, was president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, a member of the Albanian nationality was president of the Federal Assembly, while in over ten countries, individuals of the Albanian nationality were Yugoslav ambassadors.

Just as in legislation, so too in practice, the international standards for protection of national minorities were respected in Yugoslavia until the end of the 80s. In the course of this, nationalities enjoyed standards higher than those in the international community, and this was especially the case with the Albanian (and Hungarian) minority, because it was believed that this strengthened Yugoslavia's cohesion.

In March 1981 unrest flared up in the Province of Kosovo. Student protests on account of the living conditions grew to become a wave of demonstrations, strikes and plundering. Many of the demonstrators demanded for Kosovo the status of a republic, within the framework of Yugoslavia, and part of them

demanded total independence and annexation to Albania. After a state of emergency was declared, army units intervened and it was communicated that in the ensuing clashes 11 people were killed (9 demonstrators and 2 policemen) and hundreds were wounded. Several hundred Albanians were accused of, and tried for, belonging to "illegal organizations" with "nationalist or irredentist aims". Two thirds of the political prisoners, sentenced for nationalist activities (most often for verbal offenses) in the 80s, were Albanians, arrested after 1981. The tensions on Kosovo continued to increase, so much so that in 1987 special police forces were sent from Belgrade to quash the separatist activities.

The reasons for the dissatisfaction of the Albanians in Kosovo, in spite of the autonomy they had, can be sought in the economic sphere. The large investments of the Federation in Kosovo, which are deemed to have covered 70% of the provincial budget, were invested mainly in ineffective projects which did not advance the economic conditions in Kosovo, in comparison with the other parts of Yugoslavia. The national product in Kosovo in 1990 was around one eighth of the product of Slovenia, and for those who completed their university education it was difficult to find employment <sup>5)</sup>.

Aside from the traditional mistrust between Albanians and Serbs in the region, it is paradoxical that Albanian dissatisfaction came about also as a result of their success in the area of minority rights. Namely, the creation of the separate university in the Albanian language and the development of the cultural programs, also as a result of the cooperation with the Albanians from Albania, made the Albanians in Kosovo more educated and conscious of their identity. Albanian pride, combined with economic dissatisfaction, in many cases led to strong separatist feelings. The University in Priština grew to become a bastion of Albanian chauvinism and secessionism, a place for national indoctrination of the students who were fighting for a "Republic of Kosovo", rather than for educating university graduates, intellectuals and experts.

On the other hand, the Serbian population in Kosovo was decreasing continually in relation to the Albanian one, both as a number and a percentage. If in 1931 the population of Kosovo was a little over 500,000, half of whom were believed to be Albanians, after the Second World War they already constituted two thirds of the population of Kosovo. The number and percentage of Albanians in Kosovo was increasing constantly: 67% in 1961, 73.7% in 1971, 77.5% in 1981 and full 90% in 1991. On the other hand, the number of Serbs in Kosovo was constantly decreasing: from 23.5% in 1961, 18.4% in 1971 and 13.3% in 1981, to only 10% in 1991. These demographic shifts are to a large degree a result of the high birth rate of the Albanians, which was three times bigger than the Yugoslav average, and the highest in Europe.

The second factor is in relation to the migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, which is estimated to amount to 400,000 persons after the Second World War, and at least 25,000 during the 80s. Serbs were abandoning their homes in Kosovo, where their families had lived for centuries, not only out of economic reasons (which was also a cause of Albanians leaving Kosovo and moving to other parts of the country or as economic migrants abroad). A significant number of them were complaining about the discrimination of the Albanians in Kosovo against them. Many reports spoke of criminal acts perpetrated by Albanians against Serbs: the burning of Serbian houses, sexual violence towards Serbian women, attacks on Serbs in the street and mistreatment of Serbian children in the schools. Serbian churches and graves were desecrated or destroyed; even in stores there were cases where Serbian customers were not served.

A research project on the causes for the migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, carried out by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1985 in 23 settlements in 5 municipalities, points that the basic reasons for this are not economic. Namely, only 15-25% of those who emigrated cited economic reasons, and 75-85% of them were motivated by the ethnic discrimination against the Serbs and Montenegrins in all aspects of family and social life; 35.2% stressed that they were physically threatened - attacks against their family, beatings, attacks with stones, serious physical injuries, rape (even of small girls) and murders; 46.7% mentioned threats, offenses, being persuaded to leave, and further the damage caused to their property, having their harvest and land plundered, their livestock killed or stolen, having their buildings, shops and graves demolished, as reasons for them to have left Kosovo <sup>6)</sup>.

## 2. The position in Kosovo after 1989

The amendments to the Constitution of Serbia in 1989 significantly limited the autonomy of Kosovo on the legal, economic and educational plane. One of the amendments stated that the Albanian language was to be no longer a language for official administration, and another one, submitted just before the vote was taken, quashed the right of Kosovo to veto the future constitutional changes in Serbia that are directly in relation to that province. The Serbian constitutional amendments were passed by the Kosovo Assembly, towards the end of March 1989.

On July 2, 1990 the illegal Kosovo Assembly proclaimed Kosovo as an independent and equal entity within the framework of the Yugoslav federation. Three days later the Kosovo Assembly and the other government offices in the province were suspended by the government of Serbia. The Serbian authorities

took over the control of the most important institutions and firms. The non-Albanians in Kosovo were prohibited from selling their property to Albanians and to move out of the province.

In September 1990, Serbia adopted a new Constitution. The leading Albanian opposition organization, the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo decided not to participate in the multiparty elections in December 1990, calling upon the Kosovo Albanians to boycott them. In that way the 34 seats in the Serbian Assembly allotted for representatives from Kosovo, were not filled by Albanian members.

The limitations and the actual suspension of the autonomy of the province Kosovo within Serbia, led to vehement protests of the Albanian population which ended up in clashes with the Serbian authorities, with a number of casualties and wounded. Furthermore, around 100,000 Albanians protested in Priština in November 1988. In March 1989 a real insurgence broke out among the Albanians in Kosovo to which the authorities responded with water cannons, tanks and helicopters, and in the course of this, according to official information, there were 26 killed, among whom 2 policemen and hundreds of wounded. In January and February 1990 there were also mass protests, with new killed, wounded and arrested people. After the visit of the Helsinki Commission to Belgrade, in April 1990, positive developments occurred, Azem Vllasi was freed as well as more than 100 political prisoners, including Adem Demachi, who had spent all in all 29 years in jail. The federal troops for emergency conditions were removed, but soon they were replaced by special extraordinary measures on the part of the Serbian side.

A new situation came into being - the Serbian government ruled over the province, but was not able to control its population. The government and Parliament of Serbia took over the operations of local Kosovo institutions. The Kosovo Albanians then formed a system of parallel government and public institutions. The dual administration persists to this day.

One of the main reasons for the actions of the Serbian authorities was the ill treatment of the Serbian and Montenegrin community of Kosovo by the numerous Albanian population, in a wide range from harassment in everyday life to violent acts against individuals. However, instead of looking for a solution for that situation, by actually punishing the culpable individuals in a very effective criminal law system, the Serbian authorities responded in a "wide front" against the entire Albanian population in Kosovo, violating the rights and freedoms of many innocent individuals <sup>7)</sup>.

In the new situation the members of the Albanian nationality in Kosovo organized themselves into several political parties. The "Coordinating Council of the Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia", under the presidency of the president of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, on October 12, 1991, in Priština, adopted a "Political Declaration" in which it stated three options for resolving "the Albanian question in Yugoslavia." According to the first option, if the external and internal borders of Yugoslavia would not be changed, a "Republic of Kosovo" would be formed as a sovereign and independent state with the right of joining with the community of new sovereign states of Yugoslavia. The Albanian nationality that lives in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro would have the right to have the status of a nation with the corresponding rights. The second option would apply in case the external borders of Yugoslavia remained the same, but if the internal ones were to be changed, then the demands would be to form in Yugoslavia an "Albanian Republic", on the same ethnic principles that were valid for the Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians and the other nations in Yugoslavia. According to the third option, if the external borders of Yugoslavia were to be changed, the Albanians, with a general declaration and a referendum, would opt for territorial unification with Albania, creating in that way "an Albanian state in the Balkans with ethnic borders".

The international community, however, considers the recognition of an independent Kosovo a risk. On one hand, that would disrupt the principle of recognizing new states within the unaltered republican borders. On the other hand, that could cause a chain reaction of separatist demands by minorities that live on the territories of multinational states in Europe and beyond. That is why the message of the international community was clear - that Kosovo is a part of Serbia and that secession will not be supported. The Kosovo problem is a part of Serbia and cannot be decided outside of it, but on the other hand Kosovo is not exclusively Serbia's question. The autonomy of Kosovo (actually, returning the autonomy that existed until 1989) was the frame of reference that was offered to Serbs and Albanians in order to reach their political compromise <sup>8)</sup>.

Albania was the only country in the world that supported the independence of Kosovo in October 1991 and advocated the internationalization of the Kosovo question, but under pressure of the international community, began to change its stand <sup>9)</sup>, especially after Fatos Nanno became premier of Albania in 1997.

### 3. The Kosovo crisis after 1998

From 1989 through 1997 the Kosovo Albanian population engaged in passive resistance. On November 1, 1997, Milosevic and Albanian Prime Minister

Fatos Nano convened the first high level meeting between a Yugoslav and Albanian leader in the past 50 years. Milosevic and Nano agreed to establish diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Albania. More surprisingly and ominously, Nano agreed that Kosovo was an internal Yugoslav issue. Many observers believe that Nano was simply attempting to reduce the likelihood that Kosovo would cause an armed conflict between the two countries. However, Kosovo Albanians were shocked by Nano's actions <sup>10)</sup>.

However, their reaction came soon, by military means. In late February 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA; UCK - abbreviated in Albanian) proclaimed an armed independence struggle and began attacking Serbian police and security forces in Kosovo, in order to realize the aim for secession of the province. As a reaction, increased activities of Serbian security forces and army took place, in and around Prishtina as well as in the Drenica region of Central Kosovo. Since the beginning of March 1998 special antiterror forces of the Serbian Police, equipped with heavy armament, started violent blows against KLA (UCK) fighters in the Drenica region, but on that occasion, with excessive use of force, whole Albanian families were killed. According to UNHCR Office in Belgrade, 14,000 people have fled from the Drenica region into other parts of Kosovo, while Prishtina-based Council for Defence of Human Rights and Freedoms informed that 3,500 Kosovo Albanians have found shelter in neighboring Montenegro<sup>11)</sup>.

On March 31, 1998, the UN Security Council initiated an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. On May 9, 1998, foreign ministers of the Contact Group announced a ban on future investment in Yugoslavia, a freeze of all production and export credits, as well as travel restrictions.

However, on May 15, 1998, Rugova and Milosevic met in Belgrade and issued a joint statement to the effect that there is a "political will on both sides to resolve the Kosovo issue by political means". A week later, the two delegations met in Prishtina. Proposed sanctions against Yugoslavia were dropped for the time being <sup>12)</sup>.

The violence in Kosovo has escalated, by both sides. KLA attacked police forces, and even Albanians who were loyal to the authorities. Serbian side used unnecessary force to react to this - they were bombing and burning the whole villages, thereby killing the innocent Albanian population. According to statements made in July 1998 by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, approximately 90,000 people have been displaced as a result of the fighting - 60,000 remain in Kosovo, 13,000 have fled to Albania, and 15,000 to Montenegro. Serbian forces reportedly were engaging in tactics similar to those

used in the war in Bosnia - the systematic destruction of villages inhabited by ethnic Albanians...

On June 15, 1998, in Moscow a Yeltsin-Milosevic declaration was issued. Milosevic agreed to cut back security forces in Kosovo in "accordance with the cessation of terrorist activities" to allow for the return of refugees, the freedom of movement for diplomats and humanitarian organizations, to negotiate with Kosovo, and ensure that Kosovo civilians would not be harmed by Serbian forces. But, Milosevic was still failing to comply with cessation of fighting. For their part, Kosovo representatives refused to meet with Yugoslav representatives as long as Serbian troops remained in Kosovo and fighting continued<sup>13)</sup>.

Alarmed at the linkage between KLA and the destabilizing political events in Albania, as well as by the pronouncements of some KLA leaders that their goal was to liberate "all Albanian territories" (that is: Kosovo, as well as parts of Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece), NATO tolerated renewed Serb offensives in late July and August 1998. The offensives did indeed rout the KLA and also displaced a huge number of ethnic Albanians, killing hundreds of them.

On September 25, 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1199, requiring decisive actions by Belgrade to alleviate human suffering in Kosovo and to begin an immediate dialogue with the Kosovars. In the days and weeks following the UN Resolution, the situation in Serbia was tense. US envoy Richard Holbrooke arrived in Belgrade on October 5, beginning a series of meetings with Milosevic and the Kosovo Liberation Army. His efforts proved a success in the short run, gaining a last-minute settlement. On October 13, Holbrooke announced that he had secured an agreement with Milosevic. Not coincidentally, on the same day, Brussels announced that NATO would act "quickly and efficiently" if asked to restore peace in Kosovo. By this agreement, Milosevic agreed to accept: a) 2,000 strong observer mission from the OSCE in Kosovo, charged with ensuring Yugoslavia's compliance with UN Resolution 1199; b) noncombat flights by military aircraft over Kosovo as a part of the monitoring mission; c) Yugoslav Government will unconditionally grant a degree of autonomy to Kosovo. If an agreement between two sides is reached, it is expected that the OSCE will subsequently oversee local elections in Kosovo.

The agreement was signed, on October 16, by OSCE Chairman Bronislaw Geremek and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic. On October 25, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No.1203, which stressed that FR



Yugoslavia must unconditionally comply with the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement and called on all sides to begin negotiations concerning the general framework of the political settlement. On October 27, after talks with the NATO commander for Europe, General Wesley Clark, Milosevic agreed to withdraw troops into the army barracks or out of Kosovo <sup>14)</sup>.

After Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement, and a NATO threat of "air strikes", Serbs stopped attacking Albanian civilians, and the KLA took over large areas of Kosovo: central portion of the province, about a third of its total territory, being either controlled by the KLA or "contested", including areas on the border with Albania <sup>15)</sup>.

The American mediator for Kosovo, the US Ambassador to Macedonia, Christopher Hill, has prepared a draft version of the agreement, but the two sides are said to be still far away from a compromise. In a situation of great divergence of the starting positions of the Albanian factor in Kosovo and of the Yugoslav leadership, the continued bloodshed complicates even further the very difficult problem of Kosovo, because in case of its further greater explosion it threatens the security of the Balkan region and wider.

Finally, proposed Kosovo Peace Agreement at Ramboulet (France) Peace Conference, that should have been signed by representatives for the FR Yugoslavia, for Serbia, and "for Kosovo", was signed only by Kosovo Albanians. Deployment of 28,000 NATO peacekeeping troops in Kosovo to enforce the agreement was unacceptable for FR Yugoslavia.

The American plan demands that Kosovo become "autonomous", denying it independence. But, what does it mean to say that borders have not changed when the "state" that is supposedly defined by them has no governmental authority within what is its own sovereign territory? In other words, if the American plan for Kosovo is accepted, the borders of the Republic of Serbia and the FR Yugoslavia will in fact have been changed, even as everyone - except the KLA - pretends they have not been <sup>16)</sup>.

Concerning provisions of proposed Kosovo Peace Agreement, on February 23, 1999, there are two types of characteristics: One is that the sovereign, recognised state of Yugoslavia is treated in terms of language and provisions on an equal footing with the Albanian self-proclaimed, non-recognized Kosovo and its military unit, the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA. As a legal document, in practical terms, 70-80 per cent of the provisions and requirements it directed at the FR Yugoslavia, not at Kosovo, since only the former has the institutions, legal means and enforcement capacity to comply. So, in most cases when the

document states what "the Parties" shall do, it applies actually only to the FR Yugoslavia.

The second is that the document repeatedly states respect for FR Yugoslavia's sovereignty and integrity while grossly interfering with it in two ways: a) by establishing clearly asymmetric relations of influence and obligations between FRY and the self-governing Kosovo, and b) by making the Civilian Chief of Implementation Mission, the de facto ruler of the province, modelled upon the Dayton Accords<sup>17)</sup>.

Throughout the document there is no mention of KLA, the Kosovo (Albanian) Liberation Army. It comes under the designation "Other Forces." One may wonder how parties can be held accountable if they are not mentioned by name or actor in the document.

Within 180 days "offensive" forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be completely withdrawn to other locations in Serbia; the Border Guard is limited to 1500 members and up to 1000 C2 and logistics forces in predetermined cantonment sites. A maximum of 2500 Ministry of Interior forces shall be disarmed to have only civil police functions.

KLA commit themselves to refrain from hostile action and to complete demilitarization; 30 days after the agreement has entered into force all prohibited weapons shall be stored and they shall stop wearing uniforms. So, while FR Yugoslav forces and weapons shall be taken out of Kosovo, there is no mention that KLA/Other Forces weapons shall be taken out of the region. KLA weapons will be brought to and registered in storage sites on the territory.

Article VIII of Chapter 7 deals with the Operations and Authority of the KFOR: KFOR will "operate without hindrance" and can take "all necessary steps" to ensure compliance by the Parties. FR Yugoslavia must accept "that further directives from the North Atlantic Council may establish additional duties and responsibilities for the KFOR in implementing the Agreement." NATO's commander has the sole authority to control the airspace over Kosovo and the airspace within 25 kilometers outward from the boundary of Kosovo with others parts of Yugoslavia<sup>18)</sup>.

NATO began bombing Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999, having as targets air defenses, army barracks and power plants in the country. The newest phase in Kosovo crisis started in that way. NATO bombing had the opposite effect: it accelerated Serbian campaign to change the demographics in Kosovo, brought the number of refugees displaced in a year of fighting to 700,000 for only ten

days and created a humanitarian disaster reminiscent of World War II. The intensified ethnic cleansing scenario in Kosovo resulted in hundreds of thousands new refugees into Albania and Macedonia. The pattern of ethnic cleansing is the same as in Bosnia: killing civilians, burning homes and villages and forcibly removing local inhabitants. In Kosovo Serbian units systematically tear up birth certificates, driver's licenses, and other types of identity documents carried by refugees. That means that those ethnic Albanians crossing out of border have never lived in Kosovo - they are stripped of their identities. Once outside Kosovo, they will reach the status of ultimate statelessness.

Although not proclaimed publicly even by militant Serbian nationalists, the scenario of cleansing parts or even all of Kosovo of its Albanian population was on the hidden agenda of the regime and the nationalist opposition alike. The project of expelling up to 2 million people from their homes and of driving them into neighboring Albania and Macedonia seems to be implemented. The risk for Belgrade doing such terrible actions becomes to be manageable after NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Moderate Kosovo Albanian journalist Veton Suroi suspected one year ago that "between 700,000 and a million people would have to be moved from the north-east toward south-west" of Kosovo in the case the Serbian regime tries to stage a partition of the region <sup>19</sup>).

Now, a partial or complete cleansing of Kosovo would probably not take more than several weeks. It would probably be followed by a more drawn-out and only partly voluntary process of "resettlement" by Montenegrins and Serbs who since the 1970s have left the region for the urban centres of Serbia, and by Serbian refugees from the Krajina, Eastern Slavonia and other parts of Croatia as well as from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### 4. The position of the minorities (nationalities) according to Macedonian Constitution, in the laws and in political life

The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia of 1991, which guarantees the rights and the freedoms of the individuals and the citizens, also contains provisions that refer to the rights of the minorities (nationalities, according to the Constitution), with the aim of achieving real equality of their civic status and the protection of their ethnic, cultural and religious identity.

Article 48 states that: "The Republic guarantees the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the nationalities". According to this Article, "members of the nationalities have the right freely to express, maintain and develop their identity and national characteristics"; "to establish cultural and artistic institutions, scientific and other associations in order to express,

maintain and develop their identity", as well as "the right to education in their own language in elementary and secondary schooling, in a way determined by law". In connection with the latter right it is added that "in schools where instruction is carried out in the language of the nationality, the Macedonian language is also studied" <sup>20)</sup>.

After the adoption of the Law on Political Parties, in 1990, 55 political parties operate actively in the Republic of Macedonia, 15 (30.91%) of which are political parties of the nationalities. Among them are, for example, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (PDPA), the Republican Party, the Albanian Democratic Union - Liberal Party, as parties of the Albanian nationality. Among the numerous organizations of other nationalities are: the Democratic Party of the Turks, the Party for the Full Emancipation of the Romas, the Democratic Progressive Party of the Romas in Macedonia, the Egyptian Association of Citizens, the Democratic Party of the Serbs, the Association of Serbs and Montenegrins in Macedonia, the League of the Vlachs and others. Eighteen, that is, 38 political parties and independent candidates took part at the multiparty parliamentary elections in 1990 and 1994. In 1990 there were 27 members of Parliament from the nationalities (23 Albanians, 2 Romas and 2 others) from a total of 120 members, i.e. 22.5%. At the local government elections in 1990, 336 deputies were elected from the nationalities (21.7% of a total of 1,580 aldermen), among whom 234 (14.8%) Albanians, 25 (1.6%) Muslims, 22 (1.4%) Turks, 16 (1%) Serbs, 15 (0.9%) Romas, 12 (0.7%) Vlachs, 6 (0.3%) Yugoslavs. In 1994, 23 members of Parliament were elected from the nationalities (19 Albanians, 2 Romas, 1 Turk and 1 Serb), that is, 19.17% of a total of 120 members <sup>21)</sup>. The Albanian party PDP, with 5 ministers members of the Albanian nationality, participated in the governmental coalitions from 1992-1998.

After the parliamentary elections in 1998, there are 25 Albanians in the Macedonian Parliament (out of the two Albanian parties), 1 Roma from the Party of the Romas in Macedonia, and several Serbs, Turks and Vlachs. New governmental coalition includes PDPA/NDP party of Macedonian Albanians, with five ministers, five deputy ministers and a proportional share in the management of public institutions.

## 5. The position of the Albanian nationality in the Republic of Macedonia

According to the census of June 20, 1994, alongside 1,288,330 Macedonians, (66.5% of a total of 1,936,877 inhabitants) in the Republic of Macedonia also live, as the most numerous nationality, 442,914 (22.9%) Albanians.

After its independence in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia has made serious efforts to improve the quality of life of the national minorities ("nationalities" according to the Constitution of the country). In this, it is essential that throughout history and in the collective memory of Macedonia there were no major interethnic conflicts, which makes the co-existence of the Macedonian people and the nationalities easier, i.e. it is a factor in the alleviation of the occasional interethnic tensions.

The Albanians, as the most numerous nationality, live in compact settlements in the western part of Macedonia, towards the border with Albania, in the north-western part, towards the border with FR of Yugoslavia (Kosovo), as well as in Skopje and Kumanovo. They comprise the majority of the population in Tetovo, Gostivar, Ki~evo, Debar and other towns.

In 1990 political parties of the Albanian nationality in the Republic of Macedonia were formed. The members of the Albanian, as well as of the other nationalities, enjoy a high degree of human rights and protection of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity. They have their representatives in the institutions of the system. The state also implements policies of "affirmative action" with the aim of increasing the representation of the members of the nationalities in many areas, such as the police, the army, in education, in the judicial system etc.

Since the second half of 1992, part of the Albanian politicians in the Republic of Macedonia radicalized their demands for collective political rights. The demand for territorial autonomy for the so-called region of Illyrida in the western areas of Macedonia; the formation of a paramilitary organization also for members of the moderate wing of the party PDP (among whom were the former secretary general of the party and the deputy ministers for health and defense)<sup>22</sup>); the beginning of operation of the illegal university in the Albanian language in Tetovo in 1995; the anti-constitutional raising of the Albanian flag in front of the municipal assemblies in Gostivar and Tetovo in 1997 - can be considered as steps in the direction of creating "parallel authorities" of the Albanians in different segments of life in the Republic of Macedonia.

It is characteristic that, in the name of human rights of minorities and for a stable resolution of internal conflicts, part of the representatives of the international community devoted significant attention to the rights of the Albanians, especially in Serbia and Macedonia. These activities often went to the extent of stirring and even giving legitimacy to the Albanian national aspirations. In the course of this, it was not rare to see the international

community acting in contradiction, for example, with its activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In its policies towards the Republic of Macedonia, during 1993, the international community seemed to be making the same mistake. It started from the premise that interethnic conflict was the primary source of instability, that could escalate into armed hostilities and war, and so it placed the human rights of the Albanian minority in the focus of its activities. The members of the international community were doing this in a situation when Albanian politicians were already demanding the status of a constitutive nation and the rights that originate from that. Every guarantee of human rights should be based on the constitutional, legal and political provisions that are implemented equally for all individuals and all minority groups. Singling out the largest minority, the Albanian one, for special treatment, was in full contradiction to this principle. In the beginning of 1994, however, they considered that the Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia should have the right to territorial autonomy in the western regions, and that the non-recognition of that right would mean not recognizing their human rights. By this, not only were they maintaining the ambiguity of the legitimacy of Serbian rule in Kosovo, signaling their support to the Albanian project for a separate state, but it seemed that they were assisting this project in the part of their aim for joining with the Albanians in Macedonia and Albania<sup>23</sup>).

In the Republic of Macedonia, the representatives of the international community had the intention not to allow two scenarios according to which war could break out and spread beyond the borders. One was to prevent the connection between the Albanians in Kosovo and those in the Republic of Macedonia, by exerting pressure on the Macedonian Government to guarantee the minority rights for the Albanians in the state. The other one was to prevent internal destabilization in the way of interethnic conflicts between Macedonians and Albanians as members of the largest nationality. In the course of this no lesson was learned from the wrong treatment of the relation between borders and human rights. The sustained attention that was devoted to the Albanians by the missions of the international community had the opposite effect. It stimulated the radicals among the Albanians to put forward their demands for national rights on a territorial basis in Macedonia. This made the political moderates in the Albanian community, who preferred the approach in the way of civil rights, to address their voters with an election platform in which they would demand the status of a constitutive nation in the Republic of Macedonia.

Just as in the other republics, placing separate ethnic groups in the forefront, rather than the development of stable democratic political institutions, or assistance with the economic reforms and development, was counterproductive also in the Republic of Macedonia<sup>24)</sup>.

After the riots in Albania, the end of Sali Berisha's Government and the coming to power of the new Government of Fatos Nanno in 1997, a new situation obtained: Tirana was not giving up its care for the Albanians who live in the Republic of Macedonia and its obligation to support the advancement of their position in it, but it was signaling that the minority rights of the Albanians should be satisfied according to European standards and within the institutions of the system, and not by disloyalty towards the state, not in the streets and through parallel institutions.

The significant advancement of Macedonian-Albanian relations was manifested also in the first meeting between the premiers of Albania and Macedonia, Fatos Nanno and Branko Crvenkovski, on January 15 and 16, 1998 in Skopje<sup>25)</sup>, when a total of 14 agreements between the two states were signed, for mutual cooperation in various areas. The Albanian premier Fatos Nanno had a meeting with the political parties of the Albanians in Tetovo, where he stated that "the Albanian question" in the Balkans, that is, Albanian unification is seen by today's official Tirana in a future united Europe. He stressed that Albania would always stand for the protection of the aspirations of the Albanians when they are expressed in a democratic and modern way as a condition for integration in the European processes, and that the attempts to expose extreme views can only be detrimental to Albanian policies. In the talks and interviews held during his stay in Macedonia, Fatos Nanno rejected the burden of national radicalism, forced by his predecessor, stressing that "national-patriotism is an antiquated thing"; and "separate institutions, parallel institutions, ghettoization... cannot assist the spirit of cohabitation, of common living and progress"<sup>26)</sup>.

In this way, the Government of Fatos Nanno announced that he would conduct Albanian foreign policy by European standards, because in order to obtain links with Europe, Albania must behave in a European way, and to improve its relations with its neighbors. In effect, the advancement of Albanian-Macedonian relations represents a step forward towards integration into Europe for both countries, who have undisputed economic and political interests for close cooperation, as well as a common strategic interest in regional stability<sup>27)</sup>.

## 6. UNPREDEP mission in Macedonia

In the letter by the UN Secretary General addressed to the President of the Security Council, dated 23 November 1992, it is stated that President Kiro Gligorov requested the deployment of UN observers in Macedonia "due to his concerns over the possible influence on his country of the fights in other parts of the former Yugoslavia". Explaining the reasons for the requested UN preventive action, Mr. Kiro Gligorov, President of the Republic of Macedonia underlined: "We made efforts for peaceful resolution of the crisis (in the former Yugoslavia), however it was demonstrated that the nationalistic and aspirations for greater states in certain areas flared up the war, the horrible consequences of which we are today witnessing. Our only ambition was to secure the independence and the future for the new Macedonian state by peaceful means... Preseverance of peace and stability in Macedonia has a wider significance for the whole region in order to prevent the spreading of the war, to warn of other possible tensions and conflicts" <sup>28)</sup>.

In the Report of the UN fact-finding mission is stated that "the main reason for the request was Macedonian concern the eventual escalation of the conflict in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo fights could be spread in the Republic of Macedonia. This concern was, connected with the supposed activities of the Albanians from Albania and from Macedonia, and found its basis in the statement by Albania that in case of a conflict in Kosovo Albania would intervene bin support of the Albanians from Kosovo. In doing so the Albanian troops would pass though western Macedonia which is the only road transport link with that Province. In such a situation the Macedonian authorities supposed that western Macedonia would become a base for the Albanian operations in Kosovo, and that part of the Albanian minority in Macedonia would also be involved in the conflict. This would provoke the Yugoslav Army to go into the Republic of Macedonia what would lead to wider Balkan war" <sup>29)</sup>.

The Republic of Macedonia also stated the following factors among the factors for the request:

- The large number of refugees that would come from Kosovo into Macedonia if the above mentioned situation would occur, and what would have a destabilizing effect on the country;
- Several nationalistic statements by certain circles in Serbia which were the cause for concern over the possible territorial aspirations of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia towards the Republic of Macedonia;
- The fact that Macedonia was especially vulnerable because of the modest level of defense preparedness, in a situation when the Yugoslav People's Army



when withdrawing from Macedonia also took the hard arms and aviation, as well as the equipment for border inspection.

In view of the above stated, the fact-finding mission recommended that small UNPROFOR troops be deployed at the Macedonian side of the border with Albania and with FR Yugoslavia with primarily preventive mandate of observing and reporting any development in the border zones with Yugoslavia and Albania which could endanger the confidence and stability in Macedonia or to threaten its territory.

The troops did not have a mandate to fight for the defense of the Macedonia borders, but to be positioned between forces that could otherwise be involved in a conflict. In view of the fact that the constant and visible presence is of paramount importance, the UN troops established observing posts operating 24 hours a day and staying in their vicinity.

With the unanimously adopted Resolution No. 795 of 11 December 1992, the Security Council approved the Secretary General's proposal, implementing the idea for preventive deployment of UN troops, for the first time, in the Republic of Macedonia. The Nordic battalion consisting of 800 soldiers was soon deployed, and was enlarged with about 350 American soldiers in May 1993<sup>30)</sup>. With a new Security Council Resolution No.983 of March 31 1995 in Macedonia UNPREDEP mission (The UN Preventive Deployment Force) was established, as an independent mission who communicated directly to New Headquarters since February 1996.

The Government of the Republic of Macedonia demanded extension of UNPROFOR/ UNPREDEP mandate every six months. UNPREDEP became a peacekeeping mission that is the only successful example of preventive diplomacy, which gave its contribution to some stability in Macedonia compared with other parts of ex-Yugoslavia.

The reasons for the presence of UNPREDEP have not changed, even the situation became worse with exploding the Kosovo crisis in 1998. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan had requested that the UNPREDEP mission in Macedonia be extended for another six months in the light of the continuing fighting in Kosovo. However China vetoed resolution for extension of UNPREDEP's mandate. The mission ceased operations on February 28, 1999, after monitoring Macedonia's Albanian and Serbian frontiers since 1993. It was widely suspected that the veto came in retaliation for Skopje's decision to recognize Taiwan. At the end, the UNPREDEP forces involved about 360 Americans, 640 Scandinavians, and 50 Indonesians. The absence of

UNPREDEP troops from Macedonian border can only make the situation worse.

## 7. Republic of Macedonia during the newest phase of Kosovo crisis

After Kosovo crisis have exploded in 1999, there are two additional threats to the stability of Macedonia:

a) as hosts to NATO troops originally meant to be peacekeepers in Kosovo, Macedonians fear that it is possible Yugoslav Army to be turned against them any day now. They also fear being forced to become a base for ground invasion against a neighbor whose vengeful memory will endure much longer than NATO's presence.

b) the wave of refugees will upset Macedonians' own delicate demographic balance by emboldening its Albanian and Serb minorities, leading to the same kind of ethnic and religious polarization that has torn apart the rest of the region.

Macedonia's predicament is but one of number of destructive spillover effects that could result from NATO's decision to bomb Yugoslav forces. It could strain the tenuous peace process in Bosnia, contribute to the state of semi-lawlessness in Albania and even antagonize tensions between Greece and Turkey. But Macedonians fear they could have the most to lose. "People are afraid that after Kosovo comes Macedonia... The first day of NATO bombing the Christian segment of population was very quiet and the Muslim segment, especially the ethnic Albanians, were celebrating with music... Macedonia's polarization would be worse. It could lead to disintegration" <sup>31)</sup>.

On March 28, 1999, Macedonian government announced that it would accelerate its campaign to be granted official membership in NATO. The country has been keen to secure a protection guarantee from the alliance and for that reason agreed in October 1998 to be the launching site for about 12,000 NATO peacekeeping force that was to enter Kosovo. Namely, NATO presence in Macedonia is for two reasons: a) to "extract" OSCE verifiers from Kosovo if their security was threatened; b) to serve as a base for and reinforcement of the NATO forces stipulated in the Paris Kosovo document. However, OSCE verifiers withdrew from Kosovo before NATO bombing; and Paris Kosovo Agreement was not signed at all.

From their prospective, Yugoslavia considers the NATO extraction force a potential aggressor. The Yugoslav military and political leadership now

perceive Macedonia as hosting forces aimed at aggression on Yugoslav territory - friends of your enemies being your enemies too. German forces are strongly represented and bring heavy equipment, and it is the first time they may get into regular warfare and not peacekeeping. Not surprisingly, Yugoslavs conscious of history will be reminded of last time Germany came to that region (1941).

The ultimate worry for both Macedonia and Albania is the possibility of becoming a target for Yugoslav military reprisals. Officials went out of their way to deny a charge by Belgrade that NATO troops in Macedonia were poised to invade Yugoslavia. "The speculation is completely untrue", said the Macedonian Defense Minister Nikola Kljusev. "We said in the Parliament, on March 24, 1999, and before that, that Macedonia will not be used in an attack against the neighbor, and the neighbor respects this"<sup>32)</sup>. But, NATO should also respect this.

The NATO presence has placed the Macedonian government in a difficult spot. The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia is highly unpopular among most Macedonians, as would be any ground invasion of Yugoslavia. The majority of Macedonians, Orthodox Christians and of Slavic descent, have cultural and religious ties with Serbia, and when bombing started many have been on the phone to relatives in Serbia to make sure they are alive and unharmed.

After NATO bombing of Yugoslavia it can not be excluded that the Yugoslavs will retaliate against NATO troops where they are nearest, namely in Macedonia, e.g. in Kumanovo, where they are co-located with UN Blue Helmets.

As a consequence of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, on March 25 1999, pro-Serbian demonstrators attacked the US Embassy in Skopje, as well as French, German and British embassies. Demonstrations were organized by the Democratic Party of the Serbs in Macedonia,

who are numbering about 40,000 (2%) of Macedonian population, and their main slogan was "NATO out of Macedonia"<sup>33)</sup>.

On March 31,1999, three US soldiers on reconnaissance patrol along the Macedonian-Yugoslav border came under attack of Serbian forces and were missing. They were on a daytime reconnaissance mission in the Kumanovo area of Macedonia near the southern Yugoslav border. If it is true that they were trapped in the Macedonian side of an unmarked border, there were

probably cooperation of local Serb minority with Serbian troops over the border.

Macedonia is a fragile country, economically and in terms of unresolved problems in the relations between the majority Macedonians and the 22.9 per cent Albanian citizens. It has serious unresolved problems in the fields of economy and in relations with its neighbours.

Small but effective OSCE mission and the highly respected UN mission UNPREDEP have given its contribution, till 1999, to some stability in Macedonia compared with other parts of ex-Yugoslavia. In the new circumstances, the previous UNPREDEP mission in Macedonia, including 350 US troops, that been patrolling Macedonia's borders since 1993, joined NATO troops in Macedonia. UNPREDEP was placed in Macedonia as a so-called tripwire - to monitor borders with Serbia and Albania, and to discourage territorial claims of these two countries, as well as of Bulgaria and Greece.

Macedonia's ability to receive refugees is limited. It's contingency planning covers 20,000. Now, when things went really wrong, at least ten times more may run away. To where? Well, in contrast to last year, economic crisis-ridden Montenegro may close its border (it took 50,000 equivalent to 10 pct of its own people). Macedonia is where most of refugees will seek safety. Should it approach 100,000 or 200,000 the changing ethnic balance of the country and the general chaos could result in turmoil and breakdown. If thousands' more ethnic Albanian refugees arrive over the coming days and weeks, they could give the Albanians more political power and stoking other Macedonians' fears of a "greater Albania" being carved out of parts of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Greece and Albania.

Refugee crisis threatens by its sheer volume to destabilize Albania and Macedonia, as an indirect Milosevic's revenge in the region. Namely, if governments in Albania and Macedonia collapse under the weight of the refugee crisis. Macedonia is also worried about the impact of more than 100,000 Albanian refugees on its own ethnic mix. Refugees from Kosovo after NATO began bombing Yugoslavia were coming into Macedonia with fleets of buses which took them to Skopje, the Macedonian capitol. From Prishtina, the Kosovo capitol, thousands of vehicles, as well as trains, were directed on the main road to Macedonia. If they stay, they will change the political face of the nation so radically that the government could fall.

8. Instead of conclusion - open issues and uncertain future

By international law, Kosovo clearly is part of Serbia and thus of FR Yugoslavia. Since the inviolability of borders is the conceptual keystone of post-Helsinki European security and of American policy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, it is not politically acceptable to grant Kosovo Albanians a right to self-determination that has been denied to the Serbs of Bosnia and the Croats of Herzegovina. It is also difficult to see how Macedonia could survive were Kosovo to gain independence, since western Macedonia is predominantly Albanian as Kosovo and its Albanian minority also favors independence.

Jack Snyder links the question of ethno-national self-determination with the phenomenon of unsuccessful states and describes ethnic nationalism as an "unsuccessful option". According to him, ethnic nationalism is "predominant when institutions collapse, when the existing institutions do not fulfil the basic needs of people, and when at the moment there are no satisfactory alternative structures"<sup>34</sup>). Even though that does not give a full explanation for the revival of ethnonationalism, it points to the great influence exerted by the lack of effective statehood on the growth of ethno-nationalist ideology.

Attempts at ethnonational self-determination should lead the ethnic minorities in their supposed ethnic fatherlands. As William Pfaff says: "The ethnic state is a product of political imagination; it does not exist in reality... The idea of an ethnic nation is a constant provocation of war"<sup>35</sup>). Such a conflict is expected to result either in extreme forms of ethnic cleansing, or in the appearing of micro-states from the mini-states formed on the basis of ethnic nationalism, or in both variants.

In the process of violent disintegration of the multinational SFR Yugoslavia, in 1991 in Croatia, and in 1992 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, fierce armed conflicts began, with many elements of national, ethnic and religious hatred. After the disintegration of the multinational colossus, the Soviet Union, as well as of Czechoslovakia, in 1992, it seemed that the old national and minority conflicts had flared up again and that the central and eastern region of Europe was being destabilized, and that "ethnic cleansing" had opened "the chapter of forced re-settlement of population" in Europe<sup>36</sup>).

According to the logic of "raving" nationalisms, the Republic of Macedonia should have been the country which would continue the process of state disintegration in the Balkans. But precisely in it, which in its history and collective memory had never seen larger interethnic conflicts, and the equal position of the minorities had been one of the practically implemented principles, this process stopped. The coexistence between Macedonians and the

nationalities that live in the Republic of Macedonia continued to function, and occasional inter-ethnic tensions are resolved within the framework of the institutions of the system.

Now, at the newest phase of Kosovo crisis, Macedonia is again the country that could prevent, or unwillingly contribute, to the further process of disintegration of states in the Balkans.

It is important to say that, in connection with the presupposed possible process of further disintegration of states, in the Balkans or beyond, the conclusion of the study prepared by the Council for Foreign Relations is significant: "While the creation of some new states can be indispensable or unavoidable, the fragmentation of the international community into hundreds of independent territorial entities is a recipe for an even more dangerous and anarchic world"<sup>37)</sup>. If the powerful idea of selfdetermination were to be applied to ethnicities, and if such a combination was given legitimacy, in connection with the principle of human rights of groups, this would lead to many more conflicts in the world than is the case now.

Religious militancy, that is also present in Kosovo crisis, in relation to nationalism, is a combination which gives a stronger impulse to achieve political, ethnic and cultural autonomy by taking control over an independent state, sometimes in a violent way<sup>38)</sup>. In the different forms it takes, religious militancy can make use of direct violent action<sup>39)</sup>. Such is the example of the explicit blessing given to violence on the part of the church, both to the Serbian Orthodox Christians, and to the Croatian Catholic Christians, in the armed clashes in former Yugoslavia in 1991-1995<sup>40)</sup>.

If we apply Huntington's dioptry to the Balkan states, according to religious criteria, they would be placed in three basic groups. The countries where the Orthodox Christian religion has a dominant role are Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, FR Yugoslavia, and Macedonia. The Muslim religion prevails in Turkey and Albania. The Roman Catholic religion is dominant in Slovenia and Croatia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina all three religions intercross. Huntington's theory on the "clash of civilizations" seems to point to that part of the causes for the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1992-1995, and sees the armed conflicts in Croatia and the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia through the prism of division along the line of Roman Catholics - Orthodox Christians. In offering projections for the ensuing period, in the Balkans, it points out that disintegration can continue along the line between Christianity and Islam, which passes through Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo (which is happening

right in 1998-1999), Macedonia, Bulgaria and then also through Greece and Albania <sup>41)</sup>.

The Dayton Agreement insisted emphatically on maintaining the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that "Balkanization" would not continue neither along ethnic nor religious lines. If a satisfactory solution is found for the explosive crisis in Kosovo, without the disintegration of the FR of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Macedonia continues to be a factor of stability in the region <sup>42)</sup>, there would be a possibility that ethnonational conflict and religious militancy may become marginalized in the Balkans.

Finally, I would like to conclude my paper with several important open issues in connection with Kosovo crisis:

a) Will the Kosovo conflict, which has the elements of a clash between the options of a Greater Albania and a Greater Serbia, escalate into a new wider armed conflict in the Balkans?

b) Will the Serbian people accept, in the long term, to live as a minority in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia? Will it insist on realizing the idea of a Greater Serbia?

c) Will the Albanians abandon the idea of a Greater Albania, i.e. of creating an Albanian state also on the territories of Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece? Or will they continue to live as a minority in the FR of Yugoslavia and in Macedonia, with an advancement of their minority rights, but also with an obligation of loyalty towards the state they live in?

d) Will Bosnia and Herzegovina survive as one state, or will it be divided along the lines of its ethnic and religious entities, by the formation of a Muslim state in the Balkans?

e) Will Macedonia, which attained its independence as late as 1944, i.e 1991, with its policies of ethnic co-existence and a high degree of minority rights, remain to "cushion" the Balkan great state nationalisms and be an important element of the stability of the region?

f) Will the possible formation of a separate Muslim states, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, stir separatist tendencies of the other Muslim population in the Balkans: in FR of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece?

N O T E S:

1) According to the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY the term "nationalities" was used in referring to the national minorities and it was considered less offensive to the minorities because it does not indicate them as inferior, but only as ethnically different to the peoples of Yugoslavia.

2) The data is quoted after: Fritz Hondius, *The Yugoslav Community of Nations*, The Hague, 1969, p 13; Ruza Petrovic, "The National Composition of Yugoslavia's Population", 1991, *Yugoslav Survey*, No. 1, 1992, p 12.

3) The term Kosovo refers to the administrative unit: Autonomous Province in the South-western part of the Socialist Republic of Serbia within the SFR Yugoslavia - a territory of 10,887 square kilometres called Kosovo or Kosovo-Metohija (abbreviated Kosmet).

4) See more extensively in: Vojin Dimitrijevic, "Nationalities and Minorities in the Yugoslav Federation, *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, 1992, Vol. 21, pp 74-75.

5) See in: *Minority Rights - Problems, Parameters and Patterns in the CSCE Context*, Washington, D.C., 1991, pp 120-122.

6) The results of the study are quoted according to: Prvoslav Ralic, *Minority Rights in Serbia. Facts, Figures, Orientation*, Belgrade, March 1993, pp 34-36.

7) See more extensively in: *Minority Rights - Problems, Parameters and Patterns in the CSCE Context*, Washington D.C., 1991, pp 123-127.

8) For more details see in: Zoran Lutovac, *Manjine, KEBS i jugoslovenska kriza*, Beograd, 1995, str.119-121 (Zoran Lutovac, *Minorities, CSCE and the Yugoslav Crisis*, Belgrade, 1995, pp 119-121).

9) See in: Zoran Lutovac, "Albanska alternativa posle Dejtonskog sporazuma", *Medjunarodna politika*, br. 1046-47, 1 juli - 1 avgust 1996, Beograd, str. 25-27 (Zoran Lutovac, "The Albanian Alternative after the Dayton Accord", *International Affairs*, No.1046-47, July 1 - August 1, 1996, Belgrade, pp 25-27).

10) See in: *Update on Yugoslavia*, *East European Constitutional Review*, Vol.7, No.1, Winter 1998, p.44.

11) For more details see in: Stefan Troebst, *Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation*, 1992-1998, European Centre for



Minority Issues (ECMI), Working Paper No.1, Flensburg, May 1998, pp 1-4, 15-16.

12) See in: Update on Yugoslavia, East European Constitutional Review, Vol.7, No.2, Spring 1998, p.36.

13) See in: Update on Yugoslavia, East European Constitutional Review, Vol.7, No.3, Summer 1998, p.40.

14) See in: Update on Yugoslavia, East European Constitutional Review, Vol.7, No.4, Fall 1998, p.40-44.

15) According to US Government map (No. 746891 [R00940] 7-98) of "Areas of Control in Kosovo", Mid-July 1998, cited in: Robert M. Hayden, The State as Legal Fiction, East European Constitutional Review, Vol.7, No.4, Fall 1998, p.46.

16) See in: Robert M. Hayden, The State as Legal Fiction, East European Constitutional Review, Vol.7, No.4, Fall 1998, p.49.

17) For more details see in: Read the Civilian Kosovo Agreement, TFF Pressinfo # 57, March 17, 1999.

18) Text of Kosovo Interim Agreement can be found on: <http://www.transnational.org>, "Highlight".

19) See in: "Disrupting the Balance of Fear. Interview with Veton Suroi", Transitions, Vol.5, No.4, April 1998, p.5.

20) Quoted after: Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, NIP "Magazin 21", Skopje, 1991, pp 3-4, 8, 11 and 20.

21) Quoted after: Facts About National Minorities in the Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Skopje, April 1997, pp 9-10.

22) For this armed scandal in 1994, ten members of the Albanian nationality in the Republic of Macedonia, among whom Mithad Emini, former secretary general of the PDP were pronounced guilty for planning and organizing an Albanian irridentist army and were sentenced to five to eight years imprisonment (the highest sentence was against Emini, who was later released under an amnesty).

23) See the analysis in: Susan L. Woodward, *Ibid*, pp 340-343.

24) *Ibid*, pp 393-394.

25) On January 15 and 16, 1998, the premiers of Albania and Macedonia, Fatos Nanno and Branko Crvenkovski held the first meeting in Skopje at the level of premiers of the two countries, which followed the meeting between the ministers for foreign affairs of the two countries in Tirana, in December 1997. The two countries signed a total of 14 interstate agreements for mutual cooperation in several areas. The Albanian premier had a meeting with the representatives of the political parties of the Macedonian Albanians, in Tetovo, on January 16, and with the Albanian students and lecturers from the Pedagogical Faculty and the Department of Albanian Language and Literature at the Philological Faculty of the University of Skopje (the same day in Skopje).

26) In the speech delivered by the Albanian premier Fatos Nanno, on January 16, 1998, at the meeting with the political parties of the Albanians in the RM and with a part of the Albanian intelligentsia, in Tetovo, as well as in the interview given by Fatos Nanno that same day for BBC and MTV, it says: "I wish your country to be a modern European country... The position of the Albanians in Macedonia is good and your Government should be commended for its policies towards the Albanians... Radicalism should be already a part of the past - so that what happened in Bosnia does not occur... I am convinced, that Albanians, wherever they may be, see their future in a united Europe... in a civil society, and not in returning to the past... In the talks with Crvenkovski and Gligorov, the question of the Albanians and their normal integration into the new country which you all love, had a prominent place... Democratic Albania wants to break out of the "ring" of national patriotism by directing its energy towards European integration". Quoted after: Panta Dzambazovski, "Porakite na Nanno", *Nova Makedonija*, 21 januari 1998, str.2 (Nanno's Messages, New Macedonia, January 21, 1998, p. 2.).

27) Quoted after: Nevenka Mitrevska, "Makedonija-Albanija. Beganje od diplomatskata retorika", *Puls*, Skopje, 22 januari 1998, str.14-16 (Macedonia-Albania. Running Away From Diplomatic Rhetoric, *Puls*, Skopje, January 22, 1998, pp 14-16, which also contains a wider commentary on the improvement of Macedonian-Albanian relations.

28) Cited from: Address of His Excellency Kiro Gligorov at the Opening Ceremony of International Workshop "An Agenda for Preventive Diplomacy: Theory and Practice", Skopje 16 October, 1996, p.1-3.

29) The proposal has been cited according to the letter from the President of the Security Council S/24852 of 25 November 1992.

30) Cited according to: Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council, April 1993, para 21.

31) Quoted after: Hugh Dellios, Macedonians fear divisive spillover, Chicago Tribune, March 29, 1999, p.1, 12.

32) Quoted after: Daniel Williams, US, Other Embassies Attacked in Macedonia, The Washington Post, March 26, 1999, p.A1, A24.

33) Angry pro-Serbian demonstrators threw rocks, burned cars and attacked the US Embassy in Skopje on March 25, 1999, one day after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. No embassy personnel were injured in the attack, during which US Ambassador Christopher Hill and members of his staff took refuge in the basement vault that houses communications equipment. There they opened phone lines to Washington and to local authorities, asking for police assistance. Local riot police then used tear gas to disperse the crowd as NATO helicopters from the gathering Kosovo intervention force buzzed overhead. Demonstrators then moved on toward the French, German and British embassies, breaking their windows.

34) Quoted after: Jack Snyder, "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State", Survival, 35, No. 1, Spring 1993, p 12.

35) Quoted after: William Pfaff, "Invitation to War", Foreign Affairs 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 99, 101.

36) See in: Miall and Hugh, Minority Rights in Europe: The Scope for a Transnational Regime, London, 1994.

37) Quoted after: Gidon Gottlieb, Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1993, p 2.

38) Being quite provocative, Huntington's thesis attracted great attention in the media. It seems to be gaining support in the activities of the governments in countries such as Iran and Sudan and in the Islamic movements in the Middle East and beyond, who practically use the language of cultural confrontation.

39) Some religious militants adhere strictly to the use of violent actions: the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York by the Islamic fundamentalists, the massacre of more than 20 Muslims in Hebron by a Jewish fundamentalist, the massacre of civilians in Algiers by the Islamic Armed Group.

40) See in: David Little, "Religious Militancy", in *Managing Global Chaos, Sources of, and Responses to International Conflict*, ed. by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall, Washington, DC, 1996, p 82.

41) In Albania, around 70% of the population is of Islamic confession, 15% are Roman Catholics (in the northern part, under the influence of the Western Roman Empire and Italy), and 15% are Orthodox Christians (in Southern Albania, under the influence of Byzantium and Greece).

42) The American Ambassador in the Republic of Macedonia, Christopher Hill, in his interview for the weekly "Puls" stated that "Macedonia is not a part neither of the Kosovo, nor of the regional crisis. Macedonia, to the contrary, is a stable element of the crises in the region". Quoted after: Intervju so Kristofer Hil, "Makedonija e nadvor od balkanskata kriza", *Nova Makedonija*, 23-24 maj 1998, str. 17-18 (Interview with Christopher Hill, "Macedonia is Outside of Balkan Crisis", *New Macedonia*, May 23 and 24, 1998, pp 17-18.).